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2005—the year of GDP growth
slowed way down
Over the period of the economic upswing
that began in Ukraine in 2000, 2005 has
proved to be the year of slowest economic
growth. According to ICPS estimates, GDP
grew 2.5% in 2005. Despite continued
rapid growth of consumption, investment
in the country’s economy shrank. This
decline in investment was driven by deep
cuts in public investment. The lack of
public resources for capital investment was
the result of the new Administration’s
socially+oriented policies.
According to ICPS estimates, the balance 
of trade fell to US $118mn in 2005, after a
record+high US $4.9bn in 2004. In 2005,
imports of goods grew almost as fast as
during the previous year, whereas exports
slowed down from 41.6% growth in 2004 to
6% in 2005. In August 2005, for the first
time since 1999, the balance of trade in
goods became negative. However, given
the National Bank of Ukraine’s high gold
and currency reserves, this negative
balance does not pose a threat to the
country’s macroeconomic stability at
present. The main factor behind slow
growth of exports was a drop in global
prices for the steel products that are the
main component of Ukrainian exports.
Rapid growth of imports was primarily the
result of rapid growth in disposable
incomes.
Agriculture and the processing industries
slowed down significantly. Slow growth in
agriculture is the result of its high
dependence on two crops, grain and potato,
which causes indicators fluctuate wildly
every year. Slow growth in processing
industries was primarily the result of a
decline in metalworking due to an
unfavorable situation with prices on global
markets and shrinking domestic oil refining
after import duty for petroleum products
was reduced and oil supplies to Ukrainian
refineries shrank.
According to ICPS estimates, gross value+
added in trade shrank 9% compared to
2004. ICPS economists say the key factor
behind this decline was the collapse of
shadow and fictitious brokering schemes in
wholesale trade that accounted for a
significant share of trade growth
throughout 2003–2004.
Although the new government committed
many mistakes that contributed little to
the country’s economic growth, ICPS
economists do not think that the steep
economic slowdown is mainly the result of
failed policies in 2005. Instead, ICPS
experts are convinced that the foundation
for sustainable economic development was
not laid during the previous years.
According to ICPS economists, slower
economic growth was the result of three
long+term factors:
Weak investment. Average growth of gross
fixed investment was 7.2% over
1998–2004. During this period, investment
was mainly channeled to upgrade
capacities from soviet times. The volume of
investment in the creation of new
companies and innovative technologies
was minor. More than half of all capital
investment involved company funds, which,
given weak financial indicators for
domestic businesses, could not be a
sustainable, multi+year source of
investment. As a rule, public investment
was distributed opaquely and priority of
government policy goals were not
identified in advance. A low level of
capitalization among domestic banks,
limited access of foreign banks to the
Ukrainian market, and high risks of bad
debt hampered the development of
commercial lending. A high level of
corruption in the public sector, difficult
access to the Ukrainian market, the lack of
a transparent and level playing field for
doing business scared foreign business
away from investing in Ukraine.
The lack of reforms. Despite the urgent
need for reforms and regular calls to
reforms by various political forces, large+
scale systemic transformations have not
gotten going in Ukraine. Urgent reforms
are needed in the social security system,
the infrastructure sector (residential
services, communications and transport)
and the judiciary. Every year, delays in
starting transformations in the social
security system have resulted in inefficient
use of public resources, while the
government’s inability to ensure
appropriate social security has served as an
excuse for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes
in full. Ukraine’s residential services sector
With weak investment, dependence on external factors and lack of reform, the
economic upswing in Ukraine that began in 2000 has been unsustainable.
According to ICPS estimates, Ukraine’s GDP grew 2.5% in 2005, not the 7%
forecast at the beginning of the year.  Over 2006–2007, Ukraine’s economy will
grow 5.5% per annum
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continues to be unprofitable, while the
refusal of consumers to pay for poor quality
services has only deepened the crisis in
this sector. Ukraine’s backward provision of
telecommunication services and its
underdeveloped transport sector hinder
commercial development and raise the
costs of doing business. This, in turn,
makes companies less competitive. The
high level of corruption in the Ukrainian
court system also raises the cost of doing
business and hampers investment.
Economic dependence on external
factors. Over the past five years, the
country’s economic upswing was largely
the result of growing exports of metal
products. This high dependence on exports
and the dependence of these exports on
one type of product made the Ukrainian
economy hostage to the pricing situation
on global markets. Indeed, when metal
prices began to slip, the economy revealed
its lack of preparedness. The prolonged
economic boom relieved successive
Governments of the need to look for new
drivers of economic growth and to
implement policies that would facilitate
structural changes in the economy. The
low price of gas and other fuels did little
to provide incentives for company owners
and managers to invest in upgrading
technologies and led to the high gas
exposure of Ukrainian economy. Steep gas
price rises will make products
manufactured by such companies
uncompetitive.
GDP should grow 5.5% annually
over 2006–2007
The ICPS forecast for 2006–2007 is for the
economy to grow 5.5% per annum. The
acceleration in 2006 will be driven by
renewed investment flows, which are
expected to grow 7% according to the ICPS
forecast on the back of increased
commercial lending and public investment.
In 2007, investment will accelerate to 9%
per annum.
After a record+high growth throughout
2005, private consumption will slow down
to 8% in 2006 and remain flat in 2007. The
slowdown in household consumption will
be because of slower growth in personal
incomes.
As in 2005, imports will grow faster than
exports throughout the forecast period.
The value of trade in goods will climb 6%
in 2006 and 7% in 2007, whereas imports
will grow 11% per annum. The balance of
trade will become negative in 2006; while
the current account balance will grow
negative in 2007.
According to the ICPS forecast, consumer
prices will grow as fast in 2006 as they did
in 2005, 11.5% per annum. In 2007, prices
should slow down to 7%, as personal
income growth slows. Producer prices will
also grow more slowly. Provided there are
no unpredictable fluctuations on external
markets, the Producer Price Index will
grow 6% in 2006 and 7% in 2007.
The share of GDP re+distributed through
the Consolidated Budget will fall back to
29% over 2006–2007. As social benefits
grow more slowly, Consolidated Budget
expenditures will remain flat in 2006, at
32% of GDP, and then shrink to 31% of GDP
in 2007. ICPS economists do not expect a
significant decline in tax rates throughout
the forecast period.
According to the ICPS forecast, interest
rates for hryvnia loans will gradually fall
closer to interest rates for hard currency
loans. The average rate for hryvnia loans
will shrink to 9% by late 2007.
Forecast risks
The ICPS forecast could prove overly
optimistic under these five circumstances:
• significant price hikes for Russian gas
coupled with a full+scale trade war with
Russia that will include removing goods
from the free trade regime, a growing
number of anti+dumping investigations
against Ukrainian exports, and
restrictive import quotas;
• further price declines for Ukrainian
export commodities on external
markets;
• low tax receipts as business performance
falls off;
• the inability of a pro+government party
to ensure coalitional majority in the
Verkhovna Rada, which would make it
difficult to adopt key government
decisions;
• the NBU switching to a more flexible
exchange rate, which could significantly
influence hryvnia and foreign currency
rates.
For more about ICPS economic forecasts, you
can contact Yevhenia Akhtyrko, our senior
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Key macroeconomic indicators
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indicators e s t i m a t e                  f o r e c a s t 
GDP, mn UAH 267.3 344.8 412.8 486.4
GDP, rcc, % 9.6 12.1 2.5 5.5 
Real industrial output, rcc, % 15.8 12.5 3.0 6.5
Real agricultural output, rcc, % +11.0 19.9 2.0 1.0
Gross investment, % of GDP 22.0 19.1 20,3 19.6 
Real gross fixed investment, apc, % 15.8 10.0 1.0 7.0
Real consumption, apc, % 12.8 12.1 13.8 7.3
Net FDI, mn USD 1,411 1,711 7,200 3,000
Real disposable household income, apc, % 9.1 16.8 20.5 6.0 
Real retail trade, apc, % 20.5 21.9 22.0 9.0 
Consumer price index, apc, % 8.2 12.3 11.5 11.5
Producer price index, apc, % 11.1 24.1 11.1 6.0  
Population, mn 47.6 47.3 47.0 46.8 
Average monthly real wages, apc, % 15.2 23.8 18.0 8.0
Unemployment rate (ILO methodology), % 9.1 8.6 8.2 8.0
Exports of goods and services, apc, % 24.0 41.6 6.0 6.0
Imports of goods and services, apc, % 28.7 26.0 23.0 11.0
Current account balance, % of GDP 5.8 10.5 2.9 0.9
Consolidated Budget balance, % of GDP +0.2 +3.2 +2.0 +3.0
Official exchange rate (average annual), 
UAH/USD 5.33 5.32 5.12 5.05
apc = annual percentage change
rcc = real cumulative change
Sources: Derzhkomstat (State Statistics Committee), National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry 
of Finance; calculations and forecast by quarterly predictions
